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OUTSOURCING ETHICAL DILEMMAS:  
REGULATING INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 
Summary 
This article argues that the English legislative regime is ineffective in regulating international 
surrogacy, particularly with regard to commercial payments. It suggests that if English law 
views surrogacy as exploitative, we have a responsibility to protect women both in England 
and abroad, and the only way to do so effectively is to create a domestic system of regulation 
that caters adequately for the demand in this country. This requires a system of authorisation 
for surrogacy before it is undertaken; ex-post facto examinations of agreements completed in 
other jurisdictions, after the child is already living with the commissioning parents, cannot be 
seen as an acceptable compromise, as authorisation will inevitably be granted in the child’s 
best interests. 
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It is unknown how many surrogate births take place each year, let alone the number of 
international surrogacy arrangements, however, statistics suggest that the use of foreign 
surrogates is an expanding practice, increasing from 2% of all parental orders in 2008, to 13% 
in 2010 and 26% in 2011.
1
 Surrogacy in England is an informal and uncertain procedure, 
where demand for surrogates far outstrips supply; as a result, couples are seeking jurisdictions 
where the legislation is more permissive and surrogates more easily available. 
 
The high proportion of intended parents using overseas instead of domestic surrogacy 
arrangements shows that English public policy in this area is failing.
2
 The shortage of donors 
and surrogates resulting from restrictions on payments and opaque laws has meant that 
couples are flowing abroad to avoid English statutory provisions, often to places where 
market laws of supply and demand drive arrangements between commissioning parents, 
surrogacy agencies, and potential surrogates. As such, prohibitive practices in England are 
leading to the expansion foreign markets, and opening up exploitation dynamics in other 
countries.
3
 In 1999, Margaret Brazier hypothesised that ‘[t]he international ramifications of 
the reproductive business may prove to be a more stringent test of the strength of British law 
than all the different ethical dilemmas that have gone before.’4 Currently, we are failing this 
test. 
 
This article will show that despite English law holding international surrogacy agreements to 
high standards in principle, in reality couples meet with few problems in obtaining 
recognition of their parenthood, in spite of evidence of commercial transactions. England has 
a responsibility to regulate more strictly both domestic and international agreements, in order 
to provide protection from exploitation for women involved in surrogacy, both within and 
outside its jurisdiction. In this light, the article will advocate for a system of regulation that 
requires prior authorisation of all surrogate pregnancies and payments.
5
 It is only with strong 
action that the market in surrogacy can be curbed and surrogacy carried out in a way that 
ensures autonomous decision-making, and respect for all parties involved. 
 
I. ENGLISH REGULATION OF SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS 
 
For some years now, England has been struggling with the dilemma of how to approach 
international surrogacy agreements that do not meet with the requirements of English law. To 
understand the approach that has been taken, it is necessary to look to the history of the 
legislative regulation of surrogacy, and the development of law in this area. 
 
England was one of the first countries in the world to introduce legislation concerning 
surrogacy in the hastily enacted Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985. Michael Freeman has 
suggested that  ‘[t]here are few better modern examples of morally panicked legislation than 
[this Act]’,6 which was drafted in response to the ‘babies for cash’ scandal arising from the 
high-profile case of Kim Cotton  (Re C (A Minor) (Wardship: Surrogacy)).
7
 As a result, the 
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Act provided that all surrogacy arrangements would be unenforceable. Commercial surrogacy 
was also prohibited, with criminal offences created for those who initiated or took part in 
negotiations for a surrogacy arrangement on a commercial basis, or who advertise to enter 
into, or facilitate, a surrogacy arrangement.  
 
This followed on from the recommendations of the Warnock Committee, which in 1984 had 
taken a very antipathetic view of surrogacy.
8
 This Committee, established to inquire into the 
technologies of IVF and embryology, believed that regulation would encourage recourse to 
surrogacy, and thus recommended that any legislation reinforce the prohibition on the 
recruitment of women and render criminal the operation of agencies for such purposes. This 
was the position taken when Parliament came to consider more fully the implications of the 
advances in reproductive technology and embryonic research five years later. Under the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill, the only specific references to surrogacy were in 
the provisions that emphasised the unenforceable nature of surrogacy arrangements.
9
 The 
status provisions in ss 27, 28 and 29 of that Act were not designed with surrogacy in mind, 
but instead were intended to cater to children born through IVF treatment, allocating 
parenthood to the couple who bore the child, rather than the genetic gamete donors. What 
would later become s30, which provided for applications for parental orders for 
commissioning parents in surrogacy, was only inserted at the Report stage of the Bill, as a 
result of the complaint of a constituent to their MP that they were having to adopt their ‘own’ 
children born as a result of a gestational surrogacy agreement.
10
 As such, a provision was 
rapidly drafted to grant legal parenthood to married couples who had entered into a surrogacy 
arrangement, provided that they fulfil certain conditions. 
 
While England is often lauded as a jurisdiction that has permissive laws on surrogacy, in 
reality, the legislative framework for recognising a birth through a surrogacy arrangement is 
highly restrictive. Although it does provide a mechanism for transferring parental status from 
the surrogate to commissioning parents – unlike in so many countries where adoption laws 
have been co-opted to this purpose – the circumstances in which this can be granted are 
narrow. 
 
A court can only make a parental order under s54 within six months of the child’s birth, and 
he or she must already be living with the applicant parents, who must be domiciled in the 
United Kingdom. Furthermore, the child must be genetically related to one of the applicant 
parents. In addition, a parental order can only be made with the consent of the surrogate, and 
her husband if he has consented to the surrogacy. While this can be dispensed with if the 
surrogate or husband cannot be found, or is incapable of giving consent, there is no 
mechanism to override a refusal to consent, even if it is withheld unreasonably, or if it is in 
the ‘child’s best interests’. Importantly, s54 applies irrespective of whether the woman was in 
the United Kingdom at the time of her impregnation, gestation and birth.
11
 
 
When setting out its opposition to surrogacy, the fundamental objection of the Warnock 
Report rested on two grounds: first, the exploitation of women, and in particular the dangers 
of financial gain in surrogacy arrangements; and second, the commodification of children 
through payments made. Following from this, surrogacy in England is required to be based on 
a ‘gift relationship’, and the use of our procreative capacities to assist others should be an 
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altruistic offering, not a commercial transaction.
12
 As such, in addition to the restrictions on 
the enforceability of arrangements, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 
requires that money has not been given or received, except for reasonable expenses. Section 
54(8) states: 
 
 The court must be satisfied that no money or other benefit (other than for expenses 
 reasonably incurred) has been given or received by either of the applicants for or in 
 consideration of-- 
  (a) the making of the order, 
  (b) any agreement required by subsection (6) [of the surrogate to the order], 
  (c) the handing over of the child to the applicants, or 
  (d) the making of arrangements with a view to the making of the order, 
 
 unless authorised by the court. 
 
The importance of the final clause, permitting judicial authorisation of expenses, cannot be 
underestimated. This is particularly the case since the 2010 Regulations (Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology (Parental Orders) (Consequential, Transitional and Saving Provision) Order 
2010) incorporated into s 54 applications the provisions of s 1 of the Adoption and Children 
Act 2002. As a result, when deciding whether to authorise payments and allow the parental 
order, the child’s welfare is the paramount consideration, which has meant an undermining of 
the principle of altruism and the gift relationship, as it will rarely be in the child’s best 
interests to refuse to recognise the parenthood of the persons who are acting as such. 
 
Given the ease at which individuals and couples can cross national borders, we have seen that 
couples seeking a child can easily sidestep domestic restrictions, presenting English courts 
with a fait accompli. As the High Court made clear in the recent case of Re PM: ‘The reality 
is there is a legal commercial framework which is driven by supply and demand.’13  
 
The dilemma faced by the courts when presented with a case of overseas commercial 
surrogacy was expressed by Hedley J in the case of Re X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy).
14
 In this 
case, the Ukrainian surrogate was given monthly payments of €235, plus a lump sum of 
€25,000 for a live birth; sums significantly exceeding what could be described as ‘reasonable 
expenses’.15 Hedley J remarked: 
 
 I feel bound to observe that I find this process of authorisation most uncomfortable. 
 What the court is required to do is to balance two competing and potentially 
 irreconcilably conflicting concepts. Parliament is clearly entitled to legislate against 
 commercial surrogacy and is clearly entitled to expect that the courts should 
 implement that policy consideration in its decisions. Yet it is also recognised that as 
 the full rigour of that policy consideration will bear on one wholly unequipped to 
 comprehend it let alone deal with its consequences (ie the child concerned) that 
 rigour must be mitigated by the application of a consideration of that child’s welfare. 
 That approach is both humane and intellectually coherent. The difficulty is that it is 
 almost impossible to imagine a set of circumstances in which by the time the case 
 comes to court, the welfare of any child (particularly a foreign child) would not be 
 gravely compromised (at the very least) by a refusal to make an order.
16
  
 
While he set out the questions that the court should be asking itself when deciding whether to 
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retrospectively approve the payments – whether the sum was disproportionate to reasonable 
expenses; whether the applicants were acting in good faith in their dealings with the 
surrogate; and whether there had been any attempt to defraud the authorities – Hedley J 
admitted that ‘[t]he point of admission to the country is in some ways the final opportunity in 
reality to prevent the effective implementation of a commercial surrogacy agreement.’17 
 
Subsequent decisions have proven the truth of this statement. In the last five years we have 
seen the courts approve compensation payments of US$23,000
18
 and US$53,000
19
 in 
California, around £3,000 in India,
20
 and £8,812 in Russia,
21
 and when faced with this 
dilemma again in the case of Re L (Commercial Surrogacy), Hedley J emphasised that it 
would ‘only be in the clearest case of the abuse of public policy that the court will be able to 
withhold an order if otherwise welfare considerations supports its making.’22 As a result, 
where the arrangement is in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which it takes 
place, then the English courts will recognise parenthood.
23
 
 
Similarly, other breaches of English law, including applications outside the six-month time 
limit,
24
 large payments to agents and mediators,
25
 deception of the Foreign Office,
26
 and lack 
of truthful information about the surrogate,
27
 have all been insufficient to justify refusal of a 
parental order. 
 
As such, we can see that the restrictions placed by the English legislature have been largely 
ineffective in stopping payments to surrogates, or in regulating the practice of surrogacy. 
Couples have had little difficulty circumventing the law, and commercial surrogacy is 
permitted through the back door. In effect, if a surrogacy arrangement is undertaken in 
another jurisdiction, there will be little real scrutiny of its terms and impact, and little chance 
for judges to be able to refuse recognition by denying a parental order. The child’s best 
interests must be paramount. 
 
What we are seeing is that domestically prohibitive laws are not operating effectively to 
prevent commercial surrogacy: the desire for a child for those parents who require surrogacy 
appears to be greater than the barriers erected by the British parliament.
28
 So we are faced 
with a dilemma: our laws are based on the presumption that commercial surrogacy exploits 
women and commodifies children, yet we know that British citizens are undertaking this in 
other jurisdictions. This article will not challenge these presumptions, although many have.
29
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Instead, it will consider whether, if we do in fact hold these positions to be true, and consider 
commercial surrogacy exploitative and a commodification of children, how should we 
legislate in light of the growing trend of international surrogacy? 
 
II. AN EXERCISE IN MORAL PLURALISM? 
 
In a comparative study of surrogacy laws produced by the European Union, it was suggested 
that notwithstanding its inconsistency with domestic law, allowing international surrogacy 
may be desirable as a deliberate safety valve to reduce internal pressure for law reform.
30
 In a 
similar way, Guido Pennings has suggested that reproductive tourism is simply an exercise in 
moral pluralism, which allows the peaceful co-existence of different ethical views. He argues 
that: 
 
 The final result of a policy of external tolerance is that a certain norm is applicable 
 and applied in society as wanted by the majority while simultaneously the members 
 of the minority can still act according to their moral view by going abroad. On deeply 
 felt moral issues concerning life and death (such as reproduction, abortion, euthanasia 
 etc), this policy prevents a frontal clash of opinions which may jeopardise social 
 peace. Obtaining the desired treatment by travelling partially defuses the conflict and 
 prevents the frustration and indignation of the minority group from accumulating.
31
 
 
This view endorses reproductive tourism as a solution to restrictive legislation, rather than a 
problem that arises out of it. However, this may lead to stricter domestic laws than would 
otherwise be the case. As Storrow suggests, ‘[t]hose who desire a procedure are apt to be less 
concerned about whether it becomes outlawed, at least if they have the means to travel in 
order to acquire it. Those who wish to prohibit the procedure may feel justified in assuming a 
harsher position than they otherwise might, knowing that cross-border reproductive care will 
temper resistance to the law.’ 32 
 
This was the argument used by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in the case of SH v 
Austria.
33
 Austrian law forbids ova donation under all circumstances, and only allows sperm 
donation where it is used for in vivo, as opposed to in vitro, fertilization.  When considering 
the compliance of Austrian law with the ECHR, the possibility for couples to go abroad for 
treatment contributed to the finding that the ban could be considered proportionate. The 
implication is that Austria was permitted to impose more restrictive laws than would 
otherwise be the case, as individuals could always go to another jurisdiction to avoid them. 
 
Despite the approval of the ECtHR, such lenience must be seen as a threat the integrity and 
coherence of the domestic legal system – both practically and symbolically. It creates a 
serious legal inconsistency, giving legal effect to a situation that the legislation has expressly 
forbidden and facilitating a practice that is considered domestically harmful.
34
 While this may 
demonstrate respect for the moral autonomy of the minority, especially surrounding issues in 
ethical dispute, such deference is not always warranted. External tolerance is difficult to 
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reconcile with the underlying assumption that commercial surrogacy involves exploitation 
and commodification. When the objection to the practice lies in exploitation, can we justify 
sacrificing women in other jurisdictions while protecting them within our own? In this 
context, we must examine the fundamental purpose underlying our laws: are they intended to 
prevent immoral acts only within our territory, or should they also prevent our citizens from 
doing the wrong thing? 
 
In relation to exploitation, it can be argued that where the ‘victim’ is subject to the laws of 
another jurisdiction, it is not the job of English law to protect her. Based on the territorial 
principle of jurisdiction, it is for her own state to decide whether she is exploited by surrogacy 
or not. We should thus defer to that country’s own judgment about what victimises its 
citizens, especially when it is not a matter of physical harm.
35
 To a certain extent, this has 
been the approach of the English courts: when considering whether to retrospectively approve 
payments beyond reasonable expenses, a key factor will be whether the payments were 
permitted under the legal framework of the jurisdiction in which the birth took place.
36
 
 
However, this thesis relies on the exploited party being adequately represented and respected 
within the community and government. In an unequal society, the powerful may choose to 
ignore the exploitation of certain groups, as a result of discrimination, or as they have taken a 
decision that the benefits they receive outweigh the costs to those exploited. Destination 
countries may receive significant advantages from having more relaxed laws concerning 
surrogacy, in particular in the form of financial benefits. Surrogacy is a multi-million pound 
industry, and there may be an economic interest in maintaining access for international 
tourists. Indeed, the Confederation of Indian Industry estimates the annual contribution of 
Reproductive Technology Techniques to the Indian economy to be US$2 billion, leaving the 
government with a vested interest in leaving it unregulated.
37
 
 
When considering whether to recognise practices that have been carried out legally abroad, 
but that are prohibited domestically, I. Glenn Cohen suggests that it can be useful to draw a 
distinction between ‘core’ or ‘central’ conflicts between the domestic law and the destination 
country, and lesser, ‘peripheral’, differences. He argues that where there is a core conflict 
between the laws in question, governments are less likely to accept their citizens going abroad 
to avoid their domestic prohibition. However, ‘[w]here the difference is smaller, a detail in 
largely simpatico criminal schemes of the two jurisdictions, the home country is more likely, 
out of comity-like principles, to tolerate that difference.’38 He contends that ‘[t]he more 
peripheral the divergence between the home and the destination country’s […] law on the 
issue, the more apt we should be to defer to the destination country and refrain from 
extraterritorial application’ 39 
 
In this respect laws are seen as being only peripherally different if the two countries are 
committed to the same moral goals in their law, but differ in some of the details as to how 
these goals should be achieved. Cohen gives an example of two countries prohibiting murder, 
but having different rules concerning self-defence and whether you can stand your ground or 
must retreat.
40
 On the other hand, if the jurisdictions have different moral standpoints on an 
issue, and the very ethical foundations of the laws conflict, then tolerance may not be 
similarly justified. 
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The difference between surrogacy laws that require all transactions to be altruistic, and those 
that operate on a market basis, appears to speak to the very foundations of the regulation of 
surrogacy.
41
 However, I would suggest that there is an important distinction to be made 
between the prohibition of commercial surrogacy because it is inherently exploitative or 
reduces children to commodities, and prohibition based on commercialisation as a contextual 
wrong, exploitative and capable of commodification only when it is undertaken in 
circumstances where it infringes on the surrogate’s autonomy.42 This difference plays a 
central role in the choice of appropriate regulation for international transactions. 
 
III. SURROGACY AS EXPLOITATION OF WOMEN 
 
A. Payments to surrogates: an intrinsic or contextual wrong? 
 
If undertaking a commercial surrogacy agreement involves an intrinsic wrong – at least 
according to our conceptions – then it is morally irrelevant where the act takes place: 
allowing our citizens to undertake commercial surrogacy in any jurisdiction involves a cost to 
our society. This is the position in France, where surrogacy, even without remuneration, is 
seen to offend the principle of the inviolability of the human body as well as the inalienability 
of personal status.
43
 
 
This was also the argument put forward by the majority of the Warnock Committee in 1984, 
which stated that the use of a woman’s uterus for financial profit, as an incubator for someone 
else’s child, is inconsistent with human dignity. The Committee argued: 
 
That people should treat others as a means to their own ends, however desirable the 
consequences, must always be liable to moral objection. Such treatment of one person 
by another becomes positively exploitative when financial interests are involved. 
 
This view suggests that commercial surrogacy is inherently morally suspect, even if the 
surrogate agreed to this transaction. It is not about the individual, but about the way in which 
it treats female body parts as a means to an end, rather than for their essential value as part of 
humanity.
44
 It does violence to the way we think about the body, life and women’s 
reproductive capacities in commodifying them, and thus reducing them to an economic 
value.
45
 As such, if we believe that by entering into a commercial surrogacy agreement a 
couple is commodifying the human body, then there would appear to be a core conflict 
between a law prohibiting such arrangements and one that permits them, and as such, external 
tolerance does not seem justified.  
 
However, it appears that despite the opinions of the majority of the Warnock Committee in 
1984, English law, as developed through the jurisprudence of the High Court in the 30 years 
since, does not view commercial surrogacy as an intrinsic wrong. Instead, there can be seen to 
be acceptance that some payments can be made to surrogates without tainting the 
arrangement. As such, the wrong is a contextual one, only arising where there has been an 
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exploitation of the individual woman. 
 
The first indication of this view came in the dissenting opinion attached to the Report of the 
Warnock Committee. Although this minority still felt there was no place for the 
commercialisation of surrogacy, they suggested that ‘the question of exploitation of the 
surrogate mother, or the treating of her as a means to other people’s ends, is not as clear cut a 
moral issue as our colleagues assert.’46 They argued that surrogacy should be seen as a 
practice that ‘could be beneficial to couples as a last resort’47 and that regulation was needed 
to ensure that it was carried out in the best interests of all involved. 
 
The clearest evidence of this contextual position, however, can be seen in the reasoning of the 
English courts when considering whether to grant a parental order despite payments in excess 
of reasonable expenses under s54(8): indeed, the very fact that such authorisation is possible 
under the HFEA 2008 indicates that commercial surrogacy is not regarded as an innate 
wrong. In a recent line of cases, judges can be seen to be evaluating the extent to which a 
surrogate is able to make an individual choice, notwithstanding the payments made, taking 
into account the availability of legal advice and support given to her. 
 
This approach was epitomised in the case of J v G in 2013.
48
 In this case, two civil partners 
from England had entered into a surrogacy arrangement in California. Overall, US$56,750 
was paid to the surrogate, US$53,000 of which was purely compensation. From no possible 
perspective could this be seen as anything less than a pure commercial arrangement, however 
the court found that the payments were not so disproportionate to expenses reasonably 
incurred that the granting of an order would be an affront to public policy. In support of this, 
the court emphasised that there was no evidence to suggest that the payments overbore the 
will of the surrogate. She was a ‘mature woman with financial means’, who had acted as a 
surrogate twice before, and had had legal advice before entering into the agreement. 
Furthermore, the Court considered the fact that she was able to negotiate a higher level of 
payment to be an advantage, as it showed that she was in charge of the situation. 
 
A similar discussion arose in relation to a surrogacy arrangement in Russia, where nearly 
£40,000 had been paid to the surrogacy agency, including £8,812 in compensation to the 
surrogate. The court noted that this was not ‘unusually high’, despite the fact that it equated to 
between one and two years’ wages in Russia. In approving the payments, the court focused on 
the fact that the surrogate had support and advice from the agency, and that all negotiations 
were conducted through a third party.
 49
 
 
In this way, we see that the courts are conducting an investigation into whether there has been 
true consent to the agreement on the part of the surrogate, with the commercialisation of the 
agreement only relevant to whether her will was overborne.
50
 This echoes the discussion of 
the Brazier Report of 1998, as to whether payment is exploitative in and of itself. The Report 
took a different view from the Warnock Report 14 years earlier, and stated that to be treated 
as an end, rather than a means, individuals must be able to exercise moral agency, and make a 
free and informed choice to carry out an act to serve the ends of others. In this light, it 
acknowledged that payment in itself does not make a surrogate a ‘means to an end’, and in 
fact, a lack of payment might be much more exploitative.
51
 As such, according to the Brazier 
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Report, the issue of exploitation rests on the capacity of the surrogate to fully understand the 
risks that surrogacy entails, and the ability to make an informed decision regarding these.
52
 
 
In this way, what this discussion lays bare is that the English approach to surrogacy rests on 
the assumption that exploitation only occurs when the decision hasn’t been free and informed. 
Compensation and payment beyond reasonable expenses are not inimical to valid consent, but 
are only contextual factors in deciding whether or not the surrogate has exercised autonomy 
in the decision.  
 
B. A new approach to the regulation of domestic surrogacy 
 
If commercial surrogacy is viewed as a contextual wrong by English law, this suggests that 
rather than prohibiting citizens from undertaking such arrangements, England should be 
trying to ensure that the requisite domestic regulation is in place so that arrangements can be 
adequately supervised and controlled. This cannot occur in international transactions as they 
are currently practised, where the court is forced to undertake a retrospective investigation of 
an agreement that has taken place outside their jurisdiction, with no opportunity to interview 
the surrogate or explore her circumstances. The futility of such an exercise has been 
emphasised in several cases where the courts have sought to clarify issues relating to the 
consent of the surrogate and her husband, only to find that the information provided has been 
found to be untruthful, with foreign agencies unwilling to provide assistance.
 53
 
 
The lack of control over foreign transactions has already shaped the legislative landscapes of 
other jurisdictions. In 2000, when the Swiss government was proposing the prohibition of 
IVF and use of donor gametes, the Federal Council argued that the only consequence of such 
a law would be that couples would travel to neighbouring countries, leaving the Swiss 
government with little ability to exercise control.
54
 This is what we have seen in the context of 
English surrogacy; individuals and couples going abroad resulting in a loss of ability to 
effectively ensure that exploitation is not occurring. Since commercial surrogacy is being 
permitted in any case through retrospective approval, it would be more appropriate to regulate 
domestic surrogacy in a way that gives the legislature and the courts greater control over the 
practice, and ensure that when a commercial agreement does take place, the surrogate has 
truly made a free and informed decision.  
 
Such a lack of control is not only important for the issue of consent, but can also relate to the 
medical and ethical issues surrounding the fertilisation and pregnancy of the surrogate. While 
the HFEA is able to regulate this within the jurisdiction, it has no control over foreign 
arrangements. When couples go abroad, there is no chance to ascertain, or regulate, whether 
the surrogacy has involved medical procedures that are medically and psychologically 
damaging. Nor is there the ability to evaluate the quality and safety standards of procedures, 
or whether there are unprofessional or unethical practices. Furthermore, there is no 
opportunity to regulate whether there has been adequate counselling or social assistance for 
the surrogate, or whether there has been independent advice.
55
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A reconsideration of the regulation of surrogacy in England does not mean that we must 
descend into a surrogacy market driven by supply and demand, but instead requires that the 
optimal conditions for autonomous decision-making are developed, and adequately 
enforced.
56
 Most importantly, this requires a shift away from the current model of ex-post 
facto regulation, to one in which authorities are able to exercise control over the agreement 
before it takes place. This could involve a requirement that the details of the arrangement – 
either domestic or international – are put before the court, or an independent specialised body, 
and their details approved before the impregnation of the surrogate takes place. The English 
courts have proven over the last six years that attempting to do it on an ex-post facto basis is 
futile, whereas requiring the registration and examination of arrangements before they are 
implemented gives a level of control over the transaction not currently exercised. 
 
Other states have already moved to such a model; for example, Greece, Israel and South 
Africa. In Israel, any surrogacy agreement must be approved by a State appointed Committee, 
which will evaluate the compatibility of all parties with the process, and oversee the 
agreement. Before it approved a surrogacy arrangement, it must be confident of the 
commissioning mother’s inability to carry a pregnancy, and the compatibility of all parties 
with the process, and have received confirmation that intended parents have received 
adequate counselling. Moreover, a mediator must be appointed to resolve any disputes that 
may arise throughout the agreement.
57
 
 
Likewise, in Greece, judicial authorisation is required before a surrogacy arrangement can go 
ahead.
58
 The Court can only consider whether the legal conditions have been met, and parties 
can enter into their own arrangements as to other conditions, as long as these do not limit the 
autonomy of the surrogate in an unacceptable way – either through preventing her from 
making decisions concerning her own body, or for compensation over the legally determined 
amount.
59
 
 
On the other hand, in South Africa, the Children Act requires the surrogacy agreement to be 
confirmed by the High Court, who must be satisfied that it makes adequate contact, care, 
upbringing and general welfare of the child. To ensure that the surrogate is not being 
exploited, she must not be using surrogacy as a source of income, and the court will require 
expert psychological and medical reports, specifics of payments and full details of the 
surrogate’s financial background.60 In this way, both couples and surrogates are clear on their 
rights and responsibilities, and an independent body is able to monitor the agreement itself, 
and its implementation, to ensure that consent is free, and exploitation does not occur. 
 
IV. THE COMMODIFICATION OF CHILDREN 
 
While pre-birth regulation of surrogacy arrangements may ensure that women are provided 
with the optimal conditions for autonomous decision-making, there still remains the concern 
regarding the commodification of children caused by allowing commercial payments to be 
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made. Elizabeth Anderson has argued that such commodification psychologically threatens 
all children, by changing the way that people value children: “from being worthy of love by 
their parents and respect by others, to being sometimes the alienated objects of commercial 
profit making.”61 
 
This was considered in detail in the Brazier Report, which found that the operative condition 
for commodification was the creation of an enforceable contract that obliges the surrogate to 
hand over the child at birth. The Report argued that if payments were permitted in surrogacy 
arrangements, it would make the transaction a commercial one, and it followed that ‘any fully 
commercial transaction of this kind should be subject to the normal laws of contract. It is 
unimaginable that a commissioning couple should enter into a contract that required simply 
that the surrogate become pregnant and give birth.’ As such, the contract would have to 
contain a requirement to hand over the child in return for the fee paid, with penalties for non-
compliance, which the Report considered could only be viewed as a form of child purchase.
62
 
While advocates of commercial surrogacy have tried to frame the debate in terms of payment 
for services, rather than payment for a child, the Report dismissed this argument in light of 
the obligation to relinquish the baby.
63
 
 
There are two possible ways to resolve this dilemma and to allow limited payments without 
falling foul of laws concerning child sale. The first is to recognise that the surrogate is not in 
fact the mother of the child, but rather the intended mother is. If this is the case, then there is 
no sale or purchase of the child. This approach has been adopted in Ukraine, for example, and 
was the cause of the conflict between English and Ukrainian law seen in Re X and Y (Foreign 
Surrogacy).
64
 
 
The second – less radical – option in the English context is to follow the lead of Israel in this 
regard. When entering into a surrogacy agreement in Israel, all sums to be paid are entrusted 
to a bank account run by a trustee, with funds only allocated with the permission of the State 
appointed Surrogacy Committee. While in Israel this can be dispensed as monthly 
compensation payments, a more suitable option might be to hold all funds on account until 
the final decision has been made to hand over the child or not. Of course, some expenses 
would still have to be paid upfront, including insemination and IVF, counselling, and legal 
fees, but the rest of the fees, including any element of compensation that legislation permits, 
may be retained until six weeks after birth when consent can be legally given. Although this 
will still involve handing over the child in exchange for money, it at least ensures that the 
surrogate is not penalised for non-compliance through being required to pay back 
compensation already received if she wishes to keep the child.
65
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This mechanism would involve some risk on the part of the commissioning parents, but less 
so than the current English system. Some assumption of risk must be seen as unavoidable in a 
system that does not require the automatic handing over of the child, which would be 
anathematic to the English position. 
 
V. WHAT OF AGREEMENTS OUTSIDE THIS FRAMEWORK? 
 
A new, more strictly controlled, legislative regime for surrogacy still does not solve the 
problem of what to do if someone goes outside the legal framework.  
 
As we saw above, English courts currently approve such arrangements, and recognise the 
parenthood of commissioning parents despite going outside the framework, as it is required in 
the best interests of the child. Despite the difficulties this creates for the integrity of the legal 
regime, this is not a position that can, or should, be changed. This is made particularly clear 
by the recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. In the case of 
Mennesson and Labassee v France,
66
 the Court found that France’s refusal to recognise 
parenthood arising from a foreign surrogacy arrangement was in violation of Article 8, as it 
did not adequately protect the rights of the child. Similarly, in Paradiso and Campanelli v 
Italy,
67
 the removal into public care of the child born through surrogacy from the 
commissioning parents was found to violate Article 8. The state had argued that the 
commissioning parents were unfit to care for a child, as they had circumvented Italian 
prohibitions on surrogacy in their “narcissistic” desire to have a child. The ECtHR held that 
public policy considerations underlying the prohibition on surrogacy arrangements could not 
take precedence over the best interests of the child.
68
  
 
As such, the hands of the English courts, and indeed the parliament in enacting new 
legislation, are tied in this respect. A refusal to recognise the legal connection between the 
child and his or her parents cannot be used as a deterrent to circumventing domestic law.  
 
Trimmings and Beaumont, when devising a draft international convention on surrogacy, 
proposed that any surrogacy agreement undertaken outside the framework of the convention 
should be viewed as child trafficking, and criminalised as such.
69
 This has been the approach 
of the Australian states of New South Wales and Queensland, as well as the Australian 
Capital Territory, which have passed legislation prohibiting commercial surrogacy 
arrangements, giving extraterritorial effect for anyone ordinarily resident or domiciled within 
the state or territory.
70
 Criminal sanctions are imposed on individuals, no matter where in the 
world the procedure is carried out: for example, in New South Wales, a fine of AU$110,000 
or two years’ imprisonment can be applied. However, the Australian Family Law Council, in 
its recent review of the attribution of parentage under Australian federal law, noted that there 
is an apparent lack of interest in prosecuting people for breaches of such laws.
71
 
 
England operates in a different socio-political sphere than does Australia, and its involvement 
in the European Union may limit its ability to impose such sanctions. A key example of this 
can be seen in the actions of the German authorities in the early 1990s, where border guards 
undertook forced gynaecological examinations upon women re-entering Germany at the 
                                                     
66
 (Appl. No. 65941/11) Judgment of 26 June 2014. 
67
 (Appl. No. 25358/12) Judgment of 27 January 2015. 
68
 This case has been referred to the Grand Chamber, whose judgment is forthcoming. 
69
 K Trimmings and P Beaumont, ‘International Surrogacy Arrangements: An Urgent Need for Legal 
Regulation at the International Level’ (2011) 7 Journal of Private International Law 627. 
70
 Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW), s11; Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld), s54(b); Parentage Act 2004 (ACT), 
s45(1). 
71
 Family Law Council, Report on Parentage and the Family Law Act (December 2013) 86. 
 14 
Dutch border in search of evidence of extraterritorial abortions. In response, the European 
Parliament stated that ‘‘the internal borders of the [European] Community may not be used to 
threaten citizens with prosecution for activities that are perfectly legal in some Member States 
but not in others’72 EU laws on free movement of persons make it impossible to impose 
restrictions on couples seeking reproductive services in other states.
73
 Similar issues were also 
addressed in Ireland in the seminal case of Attorney General v X,
74
where the Supreme Court 
overturned an injunction against a 14-year-old rape victim who wished to travel to England to 
have an abortion.  
 
Limitations on the ability to impose restrictions within the EU are not fatal to wider 
extraterritorial sanctions in other countries. However, in the context of surrogacy in England, 
both the Warnock Committee and the later Brazier report explicitly rejected even the 
domestic criminalisation of commercial surrogacy arrangements. The Warnock Committee 
recognised that there was a ‘serious risk of commercial exploitation of surrogacy and that this 
would be difficult to prevent without the assistance of the criminal law’,75 however, it did not 
want ‘children being born to mothers subject to the taint of criminality.’76 This is a powerful 
argument, particularly when taken from the point of view of the child. To criminalise a 
surrogate mother and/or commissioning parents for a surrogate birth is akin to criminalising 
the birth of the child himself or herself. The fact of that child’s birth becomes a criminal 
offense. Even if we shift the parametres, and argue that it is the entering into an arrangement 
that is criminal, rather than the child’s birth, this still shrouds the circumstances of the child’s 
birth in criminality. Such a position cannot be in the best interests of the child. 
 
A more pertinent concern is that criminalisation would drive the practice of surrogacy 
underground. There is currently no requirement that couples formalise the relationship 
through a parental order, and there is already evidence that suggests a large proportion of 
commissioning parents do not go through this formality, thus avoiding scrutiny by the 
courts.
77
 Domestically, this is only an option available in relation to a traditional surrogacy, as 
a gestational surrogacy would necessarily involve the intervention of medical professionals, 
who are highly regulated in this country. However, where the arrangement takes place in 
another jurisdiction, such medical oversight is not always present. Moreover, in countries 
such as China and Guatemala, where surrogacy has been prohibited, there have been reports 
of men ‘having an affair’ with a woman that results in a pregnancy, then subsequently he and 
his wife adopting the baby – a form of surrogacy through the back door. 
 
In this way, we can see that there is little that can really be done to curb such practices, and 
prevent circumvention tourism without compromising the welfare of the child who has been 
born. Family law remedies regulating the recognition of parenthood breach are unenforceable 
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when taking into account the child’s best interests, while criminal law remedies are not only 
unworkable, but also detrimental. We must face up to the reality that surrogacy cannot be 
regulated through punishment, but must work on safe and ethical facilitation. We must use the 
carrot, rather than the stick, and create a regime that is in line with our ethical beliefs, but is 
equally transparent and easily accessible, so that commissioning parents would not have any 
incentive to work outside it. This is what England is currently failing to do, and must be 
addressed as a matter of priority. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
One of the greatest flaws of the Warnock Report was its naïve hope that if surrogacy were 
prohibited it would simply disappear. Two lone voices spoke up in dissent on this issue, 
pointing out that:  
 
 Whatever we as an Inquiry may recommend, the demand for surrogacy in one form 
 or another will continue, and even possibly grow…As a consequence couples may 
 give up any hope of a child, may take further risks such as of more miscarriages, or 
 may decide to venture into some sort of ‘do-it-yourself’ arrangement. The latter 
 possibility – that couples are driven into making their own arrangements – is 
 particularly unsatisfactory. These arrangements would be unsupported by medical 
 and counseling services…78  
 
This has proven to be sadly accurate. Recourse to surrogacy, both within and outside 
England, has also become much more prevalent. Figures from the General Register Officer 
suggest that in 1995 only 52 parental orders were granted, in 2011 there were 149,
79
 although 
information provided to Crawshaw et al from surrogacy agencies indicate that only half of 
surrogate births are registered through a Parental Order.
80
 
 
The lack of regulation that flowed from the Warnock Committee’s reluctance to encourage 
surrogacy by formalising it in law has meant that the law has been unable to effectively 
regulate whether women are being exploited or children commodified. Ex-post facto 
examinations of agreements completed in other countries, after the child is already living with 
the commissioning parents, cannot be seen as an acceptable compromise, as recognition of 
parenthood will inevitably be granted in the child’s best interests. As a result, the English law 
is at an impasse: we do not effectively ban commercial surrogacy, but we do not effectively 
regulate it either. As Margaret Brazier put it, ‘the current state of the law on surrogacy 
suggests a scenario in which the most dangerous infertility ‘activity’ is the least regulated’.81 
 
Conflicts of law between different jurisdictions, and the lack of ability to reject parental 
orders, have led to a call for greater international regulation. In the case of Re D (A Child), 
Moylan J opened his judgment with this strong statement: 
 
This case provides a clear example of the difficulties created as a result of surrogacy 
arrangements being subject to varying degrees of domestic regulation, from 
significant regulation to none at all, and also because of the existence of significant 
differences in the effect of such domestic regulation. There is, in my view, a 
compelling need for a uniform system of regulation to be created by an international 
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instrument in order to make available an appropriate structure in respect of what can 
only be described as the surrogacy market.
82
 
 
However, while an international convention in this area should be the ultimate aim, England 
cannot rely on the hope of such an instrument coming to pass to avoid the problems inherent 
in its own domestic legislation. We must first put our own house in order, creating clear rules 
that are principled and precise, allowing commissioning couples to know their rights and 
responsibilities, and for surrogate mothers to make autonomous, and informed, choices. 
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